North Korea's Nuclear Program: Motivations and Policy Implications
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Ashleigh Sanders
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SEST-551 November 2005
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Abstract The state of the North Korean nuclear weapons program, and the purpose of such a program have been topics of international debate since the early 1990's. Recently, the debate over the purpose of these weapons has intensified due to North Korea's announcement in February 2005 that it possesses nuclear weapons. The rationale publicly given by North Korea is that it needs nuclear weapons to defend itself from an aggressive United States, and many analysts and historians agree that security concerns have and continue to be the primary driver of North Korea's nuclear program. Others, however, note Pyongyang's use of its nuclear weapons in multilateral negotiations and argue that the program is a bargaining chip for securing economic concessions from the international community. Still others contend that Kim Jong Il relies on the nuclear weapons to legitimize his regime and maintain popular support among his people. Understanding the validity of these arguments, and thereby having a clearer picture of what factors are driving the North Korean nuclear weapons program, is necessary in order to develop successful policies for dismantling this program. The thesis of this paper is that security arguments are the strongest explanation for North Korea's nuclear program, but the weapons also have economic and political value for the North Korean leadership that must be addressed in any disarmament negotiations. The first part of this paper looks at the history of North Korea's nuclear weapons programs and the security environment that led Pyongyang to consider nuclear weapons as a necessary part of their defense. The second part considers an economic explanation for the nuclear weapons program, and the third part discusses the importance of nuclear weapons in maintaining the legitimacy of Kim Jong Il's regime.
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Map of North Korea's Nuclear Facilities
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Security Explanation
Security Explanation
The justification given by Kim Jong Il's regime, and the argument made by many analysts, is that North Korea has nuclear weapons for security purposes. This argument has strong historical evidence, summarized as follows:
- The Korean War is not technically over, it was ended with an Armistice in 1958 that the US has since violated by putting nuclear weapons in South Korea
- South Korea pursued its own nuclear weapons program in the 1970's
- The USSR, North Korea's main Cold War ally, was not considered reliable
- President George W. Bush has identified North Korea as a member of the "axis of evil" that has become the focus of the US military. Iraq, another member of the axis of evil has experienced regime change.
In addition to these historical highlights, North Korea is a closed, centralized country that has little economic or diplomatic interaction with the rest of the world, increasing its feelings of isolation and insecurity. Furthermore, Kim Il Sung established a policy of juche, or self-reliance, that has pervaded North Korean culture and government. North Koreans feel strongly that they should be able to provide for their own security without relying on others. All of these factors play a part in motivating North Korea's nuclear weapons program.
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Economic Explanation
Economic Explanation
North Korea is a very poor country that entered economic decline following the end of the Cold War and the loss of its privledged trading partner, the USSR. North Korea is currently reliant on foreign aid to feed and provide for its people. Because of this dire situation, North Korea has apparently developed a strategy of leveraging its nuclear weapons program to draw neighboring countries and the US to the negotiating table to secure economic and energy assistance. This strategy can be seen in both the 1994 and 2005 negotiations when North Korea demanded light water nuclear reactors and a normalization of realations from the international community in exchange for dismantling its nuclear program. North Korea's failure to dismantle its nuclear program, and indeed its secret efforts to enrich uranium after the 1994 Agreed Framework, suggest that North Korea either does not feel secure despite assurances given by the US, or that it does not want to lose its one bargaining chip with the international community.
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regime legitimacy
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Regime Legitimacy Explanation
A third explanation for why North Korea has continued its nuclear weapons program is that the program legitimizes Kim Jong Il's regime. The plans for Kim Jong Il's succession in North Korea following his father's death were closely tied to the nuclear weapons progra in order to secure Kim Jong Il's power within the government. Kim Il Sung learned from the bloody transfers of power following Stalin and Mao's deaths that it was important to establish his son's legitimate position as his successor. Tying his leadership to the nuclear weapons program has allowed Kim Jong Il to associate himself with the security, economic and international prestige benefits afforded by the program. Because North Korea is such a closed state, it is impossible to know whether Kim Jong Il depends on the nuclear weapons to legitimize his regime, but if he does, it will be very difficult for him to ever give up the program, an important consideration in nuclear negotiations with the country.
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Timeline
1953 Korean War Ends with Armistice
1956 USSR agrees to support a North Korean nuclear research program
1958 US introduces nuclear weapons to the penninsula
1964 USSR helps North Korea establish a nuclear research facility at Yongbyon; North Korea discovers vast indigenous uranium resources
1965 USSR gives North Korea a 2-4 MW research ractor (does not begin operation until 1967)
1971 South Korea begins efforts for its own nuclear arsenal
1974 North Korea joins the IAEA
1977 North Korea signs a Type 66 agreement with the IAEA to allow inspections
1980's USSR gives North Korea a 5 MWe graphite reactor installed at Yongbyon
1985 North Korea signs the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
1989 CIA believes North Korea unloaded weapons grade plutonium from its 5 MWe reactor
1990 North Korea tests bomb componenets, opens a plutonium processing facility and a new uranium processing plant
1992 IAEA makes first inspections of North Korea's nuclear facilities
1993 North Korea refuses IAEA access to two nuclear waste sites
1994 Kim Il Sung dies in July, US and North Korea sign Agreed Framework in October
2002 North Korea admits to having a covert uranium enrichment program, effectively ending the 1994 Agreed Framework
2005 North Korea announces its possession of nuclear weapons in February, Six party talks result in the Joint Statement in September
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Satellite Image of Yongbyon
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cartoon extortion
US cartoon
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conclusion
Conclusion
There is no single explanation for what is motivating North Korea's nuclear weapons program. There is ample evidence that the nation feels insecure and has pursued nuclear weapons to bolster its security. The security explanation, however, does not account for North Korea's bargaining strategy of leveraging its nuclear weapons for economic and energy concessions. The security explanation also does not address the role nuclear weapons may be playing in legitimizing Kim Jong Il's regime. Because there are multiple motivations for the program, the US and other nations will need to be mindful of the complex role North Korea's nuclear weapons play in providing national, economic and regime security for the country in negotiating agreements for dismantling the program.
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